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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
just those who through no added fault happen to cause a fatal injury.
Where drunkenness actually causes death, the situation is different.
Criminal liability normally attaches to homicide that is neither justi-
fiable nor excusable. In the absence of causal relationship between
death and the fault of the defendant, the homicide would be excusable.
Given that relationship the homicide would be culpable. The distinc-
tion evidently stems from the general belief that wrongful conduct
warrants punishment either for itself or when it results in special harm,
but not otherwise. A rule of absolute liability would abrogate the
distinction between excusable and inexcusable homicide and would
punish drunkenness as though it had caused special harm when in fact
it had not. The suggested presumption, on the other hand, would retain
the normal distinction, which is based on the community's sense of
justice. Of course, the present rule, requiring the prosecution to prove
proximate cause, preserves the distinction also.26
GuST S. DOCES
Search Incident to an Arrest. In a recent case, State v. Michaels,'
the Washington Supreme Court announced a new rule for search and
seizure incident to an arrest: the purpose of the arrest circumscribes
the area and nature of the search.
The Pierce County Sheriff's department notified the King County
department that the defendant was driving a certain car believed to
contain gambling devices. Two King County deputies sought out his
car and followed it. After he made an illegal left turn, the officers
directed him to stop his car. After citing him for that violation, they
opened the auto's trunk and discovered suitcases containing dice,
magnets and magnetized dice.
On appeal from his conviction for the possession of gambling de-
vices, the state supreme court held that the arrest for the traffic
violation was made as a pretext for the search for the gambling devices,
and as such, did not furnish legal support necessary for the search.
Therefore, the search was invalid, and the trial court erred in denying
the appellant's motions to suppress illegally seized evidence.2
2r The present law in Washington is that set forth in State v. Baker, 56 Wn.2d 846,
355 P.2d 806 (1960). The extreme importance of this special concurring opinion lies
in the fact that it falls short of becoming a majority opinion by one vote.
1160 Wash. Dec. 639, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
2 RCW 9.47.030.
3 State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922) established the exclusionary
rule in Washington, which compels the exclusion at trial of all evidence obtained by
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Decided in 1922, State v. Gibbons established the broad framework
of Washington's law of arrest.' The court reversed a conviction when
a police officer arrested upon mere suspicion and upon the hope that a
search warrant would be waiting for him when he arrived at the station
with his prisoner. The court said:
It is not pretended that appellant was suspected of committing a crime
amounting to a felony; nor even that the sheriff had any actual know-
ledge that appellant was then committing the misdemeanor of unlaw-
fully having intoxicating liquor in his possession.
5
In the following year the court clarified and expanded its statements
in Gibbons.' Police officers, suspecting that the defendant was engag-
ing in bootlegging activities, followed his auto, observed a suitcase
being transferred into it, and made the arrest. The court followed the
common law of arrest,' including the right of the police to arrest on
reasonable cause. It discussed search and seizure:
It has always been held that a peace officer, when he makes a lawful
arrest, may lawfully, without a search warrant, search the person
arrested and take from him any evidence tending to prove the crime
ith which he is charged. If a search may be made of the person or
clothing of the person lawfully arrested, then it would follow that a
search may also be properly made of his grip or suitcase which he may
be carrying. From this it seems to us to follow logically that a similar
search, under the same circumstances, may be made of the automobile
of which he has possession and control at the time of his arrest. This is
true because the person arrested has the immediate physical possession,
not only of the grips or suitcases which he is carrying, but also of the
automobile which he is driving and of which he has control.8
Into this framework the court has fitted numerous subsequent cases.
The principle was perhaps widened in State v. McKindel,' which held
a search or seizure proscribed by the provisions of Article I, Section 7 of the Wash-
ington Constitution, which is the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See also State v. Buckley, 145 Wash. 87, 258 Pac. 1030 (1927), and Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; the latter imposes the exclusionary rule on all state proceedings
through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. State v.
Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac. 837 (1922) added the requirement that for the ex-
clusionary rule to apply there must be a timely motion to suppress evidence made by
the defendant.
4 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922).
G 118 Wash. at 182, 203 Pac. at 394.
c State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
7 See generally, Comment, The Washington Law of Arrest Without Warrant-
Incidental Search, 36 WAsH. L. Rxv. 501 (1961).
8 124 Wash. at 370, 214 Pac. at 843. See also State v. Thomas, 183 Wash. 643, 49
P.2d 28 (1935).
9 148 Wash. 237, 268 Pac. 593 (1928).
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that once police officers are lawfully on the premises, they may take
cognizance of unlawful activity (or its means of commission) which
they discover, even though these are totally unrelated to the conduct
for which the search or arrest was originally instituted.
Twenty years later the court said, in a similar case:
[T]he mere fact that relators are now charged with the commission
of a crime other than the one for which they were arrested does not
invalidate the arrest or the search incidental thereto, nor does it of
itself render the property seized incapable of being admitted as evidence
upon prosecution for the crime charged, if such evidence be otherwise
competent. Property seized either under a valid search warrant or as
incident to a lawful arrest may be used in the prosecution of a suspected
person for a crime other than the one for which he was arrested or for
which a search warrant was issued. 10
The Washington position conformed to the law of virtually all
common law jurisdictions:
The rule that a search incidental to a valid arrest is reasonable has
always been recognized in this country and in England. It is, of neces-
sity, as old as the law of arrest itself. Consequently, it did not create
any departure in the law when the courts, federal and state, decided
that such a search did not come within constitutional prohibitions
against "unreasonable search."' 1
In Mickaels the court was faced not only with the general proposi-
tions outlined above, but was also directly confronted with two other
Washington cases which were quite similar factually. In State v. Deitz
the court pronounced the following:
The rule is that, where a man is legally arrested for an offense, what-
ever is found upon his person or in his control which is unlawful for
him to have, and which may be used to establish the offense, may be
seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.1 2
As the defendant drove his auto onto the grounds of an amusement
park, officers arrested him because his auto had defective equipment.
Breaking into the locked trunk, they discovered illegal alcohol. The
defendant's conviction was affirmed, the court citing State v. lUughlett13
and saying:
10 State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Ct., 29 Wn.2d 601, 609, 188 P.2d 125 (1948).
11 MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 119 (1959). See also United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
12 136 Wash. 228, 230, 239 Pac. 386, 387 (1925).
12 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
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He bad been legally placed under arrest. The officers had the right to
search the automobile. In making the search they discovered evidence
of another crime. It cannot be said that this evidence was illegally
obtained and should therefore be suppressed. We do not think that
the rule should be thus restricted. 4
In Michaels the court purported to meet and distinguish the Deitz
case. It said:
We held [in Deitz] that, since the officers had the right to search the
car, the search was lawful, and the evidence was not illegally obtained.
The question of whether an arrest can be used as a pretext for search-
ing an automobile was not at issue in that case and was not decided.15
But, neither does that contention appear in the brief of the appellant
in the instant case, although the court suggests otherwise: "The
defendant urges, however that the search was not incident to the
arrest, but rather the arrest was a mere pretext for searching the
automobile to see what might be uncovered." 6
Actually there is no indication that either Dietz or Michaels argued
in his brief that his arrest was only a pretext. In both cases the facts
suggest that the officers had ulterior motives for making an arrest. But
in Michaels the court inquired into the officers' motives and in Deitz
it did not. The distinction made by the court, between Deitz and
Michaels appears to be without basis, and the effect is a severe limita-
tion on the rule set forth in Deitz.
The other case similar to Mickaels is State v. Olsen," in which police
officers arrested the defendant for negligent driving and impounded his
car. A search of the car disclosed a loaded pistol behind the folding
armrest in the rear seat, a set of burglar's tools lodged between the
radiator and the grill and a "sap" and a police badge on a ledge under
the dashboard. The court, in Michaels, characterized the Olsen case
in the following language:
While [the car's] contents were being inventoried for safe keeping,
the officers found evidence of another crime, with which he was charged
and of which he was convicted. We held that the evidence was obtained
lawfully. Again, there was no contention that the arrest was made for
the sole purpose of searching the car. The case stands for the proposi-
tion that, where an automobile has been impounded for a reasonable
cause, and its contents are inventoried for such a reasonable and lawful
14136 Wash. at 231, 239 Pac. at 387.
15 160 Wash. Dec. at 644, 374 P2d at 992.
10 160 Wash. Dec. at 643, 374 P.2d at 991.
17 43 Wn2d 726, 263 P2d 824 (1953).
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purpose as the protection of the owner from thefts and the officers from
false claims, if evidence of the crime is discovered, it can be used in a
prosecution.18
It is doubtful that the officers would have examined the grill-radi-
ator aperture had they been interested merely in making an inventory
of the car's contents. Rather, they were probably looking for some-
thing like what they found. The court attempts to distinguish Michaels
from Olsen on the facts because this is the only way to escape the
applicability of the following rule announced in Olsen:
The arrest was for traffic violations committed in the presence of the
arresting officer. It was a lawful arrest .... The search of the car was
legal as an incident of the lawful arrest, for under the circumstances
the officers are not confined to a search of the person but may search
the automobile which the person arrested was driving.... The fact
that the appellant was charged with a crime, other than the one for
which he was originally arrested, does not invalidate the arrest or the
search which took place incident to the arrest.19
From this statement it is doubtful that even a successful factual distinc-
tion would produce a result favorable to Mr. Michaels. The rule so
emphatically announced in Olsen seems equally to encompass the facts
of the Michaels case, regardless of whether they differed from those of
the Olsen case. In Michaels, however, the court ignored the portion of
the Olsen opinion quoted above.
The court also ignored another similar case,20 which was cited in
the state's brief. There the court affirmed the grand larceny conviction
of a defendant who was sitting in an illegally parked car when patrol-
men approached and questioned him, and thereupon observed stolen
merchandise in the car. The court said,
It was a reasonable course for a police officer to take in handling a case
of an illegally parked car when someone was sitting in it. Once lawfully
in that position, the officer could observe what was there to be seen."
In none of these cases-Deitz, Olsen, and Brooks-did the court
consider the intent of the arresting officers-it was not thought to be
significant. But in Michaels it became the decisive factor. It is no
longer the rule in Washington that every search incident to a valid
arrest is valid for whatever it turns up. The new rule--the Michaels
is 160 Wash. Dec. at 644, 374 P.2d at 992.
19 43 Wn.2d at 728, 263 P.2d at 826.
20 State v. Brooks, 57 Wn.2d 422, 357 P.2d 735 (1960).
21 57 Wn.2d at 427, 357 P.2d at 738.
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rule-might be stated as follows: Searches incident to a valid arrest
which turn up evidence of a crime other than the one for which the
arrest was purportedly made are valid only if the arresting officer
intended to find only that which would connect with the crime for
which the arrest was purportedly made. Or, discovery of evidence of
another crime must be unwitting or accidental to be successfully used
in a subsequent prosecution.
Put another way, the ostensible purpose of the arrest circumscribes
the area and the nature of the search. The precise holding that an
arrest may not be made as a pretext for a search fits in the middle of
a three-link chain. The arrest was invalid because its purpose was
invalid. Because the arrest was invalid, the search and seizure incident
thereto was invalid.
The court cited State v. Cyr2 for the proposition that the arrest may
not be merely the pretext for the subsequent search. There, however,
the arrest, search, and prosecution all concerned the same offense.
The court cited United States v. Lefkowitz" to establish that "an
arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." That
language is not relevant here, because in Lefkowitz the court was em-
ploying the word evidence in a different and more technical sense (to
make the distinction between instrumentalities of a crime and mere
evidence).24 That Lefkowitz is inapplicable for the purpose cited is
clearly shown by an excerpt:
Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to
find evidence of respondent's guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some
other crime.... The decisions of this court distinguish searches of
one's house, office, papers or effects merely to get evidence to convict
him of crime from searches such as those made to find stolen goods for
return to the owner... and from searches such as those made for the
seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars' tools, gambling paraphernalia,
and illicit liquor in order to prevent the commission of a crime. (Em-
phasis added.) 25
The court's struggle was not confined to the problem of distinguish-
ing prior cases on the merits. It also engaged in substantial judicial
gymnastics even to arrive at the main issue. There were two pro-
cedural problems-the standing of the defendant to object to the
2240 Wn.2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952).
23285 U.S. 452 (1932).
24 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
25 285 U.S. at 465, 466.
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search and seizure (since he claimed no ownership interest in the auto)
and his failure to present in proper form the assignment of error re-
lating to the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
The brief of the state and the court's treatment of these points indicate
that the court would have been justified from its previous decisions in
refusing to consider the case on the merits. 6
It is clear that the court changed the rule, in spite of its obvious
effort to harmonize the cases. Is the change a good one?
Several reasons support an affirmative answer. First, the rights of
suspects must be weighed against the interests of society. It can be
contended that by following the traditional rule only the guilty are
adversely affected, and the criminal should not be able to gain refuge
in the assertion that subsequent revelation disclosed that he was guilty
of a crime greater than the one first discovered. On the other side it is
urged that to allow such searches is to honor only the form and not the
spirit or intent of constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom
from oppressive and unreasonable searches and seizures. The latter
argument prevailed in Michaels. It is a sound argument. These
guarantees were meant to protect substantive rights, not merely to
proscribe certain police procedures that infringe those rights. If police
can invariably find a way to search, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches has effectively disappeared.
A related consideration is the effect of such a decision upon the
balance of power between state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court in
the area of constitutional freedoms. Recently the Supreme Court has
manifested an ever-increasing interest in the rights of citizens before
state courts and at the hands of state police officials." In all of these
instances the Court has, through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, effectively precluded the state courts from formu-
lating and applying their own rules in large areas of judgment.
The state courts undoubtedly desire to avoid reversal by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and it is probable that by rendering decisions such as
the one in Michaels the state courts will preserve their independence.
The Michaels decision, favoring the rights of the accused over the
26 Three judges dissented in the Michaels case, one on all three points, one on the
search and seizure and methods of raising the objection, and the other on the standing
point alone.
27 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure exclusionary rule)
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (involuntary confessions); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (use of illegally searched and seized evidence by




interests of the state, appears to harmonize with the decisions of the
Supreme Court.
Perhaps, then, the court made the "correct" decision. That this
type of thinking probably influenced the court is reflected in Judge
Finley's opinion. He reluctantly concurred in the result, saying that
he favors the abandonment of the exclusionary rule, but noting Mapp
v. Ohio,2 s he says that because the Supreme Court has foreclosed this
area of consideration to the state courts, he is compelled to vote with
the majority. He clearly dislikes the judicial straitjacket imposed by
the Court, and undoubtedly future considerations of like constitutional
questions will be deliberated with an eye toward Washington, D.C.
While no jurisdiction has apparently gone so far as Washington has
in Michaels, a recent decision from the ninth circuit suggests a similar
position. In Charles v. United States9 the court employed the follow-
ing language, though, on the facts, it affirmed a conviction obtained in
the Hawaii district court:
However, if police action is not justified by or connected with the
arrest, such as when a search of the place of arrest is designed -to
uncover evidence of a crime other than the one upon which the arrest
was made, the further intrusion upon privacy cannot be tolerated.
When a search has nothing to do with the arrest, it cannot be deemed
incident to the accused's apprehension. Divorced from the search, the
fact of arrest does not justify impairment of the right to privacy. 0
In summation, the Washington court, in State v. Michaels,. has
pioneered a new position in the Washington case law of search and
seizure, a position that is much more solicitous of the personal civil
liberties of the individual citizen. Although the court said that it was
adhering to the principle of stare decisis, the effect of Mickaels'is to
overturn much previous case law. The result helps to maintain a
healthy relationship between the state and federal courts and to pre-
serve individual civil liberties.
It remains to be seen if Washington will adhere to the new position;
use it as a starting point for further developments; or retreat from it
It is hoped that the virtual dearth of precedents from other jurisdic-
tions will not cause the court to retreat.
HAYES ELDER
28367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960). Cf. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262
(9th Cir. 1961), and McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
so 278 F.2d at 388.
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